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Abstract
The safety analysis of interlocking railway systems involves verifying free-
dom from collision, derailment and run-through (that is, trains rolling over
wrongly-set points). Typically, various unrealistic assumptions are made in
order to facilitate their analyses. In particular, trains are invariably assumed
to be shorter than track segments; and generally only a very few trains are
allowed to be introduced into the network under consideration.
In this paper we propose modelling methodologies which elegantly dismiss
these assumptions. We first provide a framework for modelling arbitrarily
many trains of arbitrary length in a network; and then we demonstrate that
it is enough with our modelling approach to consider only two trains when
verifying safety conditions. That is, if a safety violation appears in the orig-
inal model with any number of trains of any and varying lengths, then a
violation will be exposed in the simpler model with only two trains.
Importantly, our modelling framework has been developed alongside – and
in conjunction with – railway engineers. It is vital that they can validate the
models and verification conditions, and – in the case of design errors – obtain
comprehensible feedback. We demonstrate our modelling and abstraction
techniques on two simple interlocking systems proposed by our industrial
partner. As our formalization is, by design, near to their way of thinking,
they are comfortable with it and trust it.
Keywords: Railway verification, CSPkB, modelling and analysis.
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1. Introduction
Formal verification of railway control software has been identified as one
of the Grand Challenges of Computer Science [1]. As is typical with Formal
Methods, this challenge comes in two parts: the first addresses the question
of whether the mathematical models considered are legitimate representa-
tions of the physical systems of concern. The modelling of the systems, as
well as of proof obligations, needs to be faithful. The second part is the
question of how to utilize available technologies, for example model checking
or theorem proving. Whichever verification process is adopted, it needs to
be both e↵ective and e cient.
In a series of papers [2, 3, 4, 5] we have been developing a new mod-
elling approach for railway interlockings. This work has been carried out in
conjunction with railway engineers drawn from our industrial partner. By
involving the railway engineers from the start, we benefit twofold: they pro-
vide realistic case studies, and they guide the modelling approach, ensuring
that it is natural to the working engineer.
We base our approach on CSP||B [6], which combines event-based with
state-based modelling. This reflects the double nature of railway systems,
which involves events such as train movements and – in the interlocking –
state based reasoning. In this sense, CSP||B o↵ers the means for the natural
modelling approach we strive for. The formal models are by design close
to the domain models. To the domain expert, this provides traceability and
ease of understanding. This addresses the first of the above stated challenges:
faithful modelling. The validity of this claim was demonstrated in particular
in [2] where a non-trivial case study – a complex double junction – was
provided a model which was understandable and usable by our industrial
partners.
In [3] we addressed the second challenge: that of how to e↵ectively and
e ciently verify safety properties within our CSP||B models. To this end
we developed a set of abstraction techniques for railway verification that al-
low the transformation of complex CSP||B models into less involved ones; we
proved that these transformations are sound; and we demonstrated that they
allow one to verify a variety of railway systems via model checking. The first
set of abstractions reduces the number of trains that need to be considered in
order to prove safety for an unbounded number of trains. Their correctness
proof involves slicing of event traces. Essentially, these abstractions provide
us with finite state models. The second set of abstractions simplifies the un-
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derlying track topology. Here, the correctness proof utilizes event abstraction
specific to our application domain similar to the ones suggested by Winter
in [7]. These abstractions make model checking faster.
Still present in these approaches, however, were assumptions that are
made throughout the scientific literature, namely that the trains are shorter
than the track segments in the network, and that only a very few trains will
ever enter the network. In this paper we address these unrealistic assump-
tions. Firstly, we develop a modelling approach which incorporates train and
track lengths, allowing trains to span any number of track segments. Sec-
ondly, we provide an abstraction technique which allows us to detect safety
violations in networks involving an arbitrary number of trains by considering
only two trains.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our modelling
language CSP||B. In Section 3 we introduce railway concepts and our two
case studies, and describe how they are modelled in CSP||B. In particular,
we outline in detail the modelling of train and track lengths. In Section 4 we
present our main result that considering two trains su ces in our analyses for
safety properties. The application of our approach is presented in Section 5
via verification of our example scenarios. Finally, in Section 6 we put our
work in the context of related approaches.
2. Background to CSP||B
The CSP||B approach allows us to specify communicating systems using
a combination of the B-Method [8] and the process algebra CSP (Commu-
nicating Sequential Processes) [9]. The overall specification of a combined
communicating system comprises two separate specifications: one given by
a number of CSP process descriptions and the other by a collection of B
machines. Our aim when using B and CSP is to factor out as much of the
“data-rich” aspects of a system as possible into B machines. The B machines
in our CSP||B approach are classical B machines, which are components con-
taining state and operations on that state. The CSP||B theory [6] allows us
to combine a number of CSP processes Ps in parallel with machines Ms to
produce Ps k Ms which is the parallel combination of all the controllers and
all the underlying machines. Such a parallel composition is meaningful be-
cause a B machine is itself interpretable as a CSP process whose event-traces
are the possible execution sequences of its operations. The invoking of an op-
eration of a B machine outside its precondition within such a trace is defined
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as divergence [10]. Therefore, our notion of consistency is that a combined
communicating system Ps k Ms is divergence-free and also deadlock-free [6].
A B machine consists of a collection of clauses and a collection of oper-
ations that query and modify the state. The machine clause declares the
abstract machine and gives its name. The variables clause declares the
variables that are used to carry the state information within the machine.
The invariant clause gives the type of the variables, and more generally it
also contains any other constraints on the allowable machine states. The ini-
tialisation clause determines the initial state of the machine. Operations
of a B machine are given in the format
oo    op(ii) = PRE P THEN S END
The declaration oo    op(ii) introduces the operation: it has name op, a
(possibly empty) output list of variables oo, and a (possibly empty) input
list of variables ii . The precondition of the operation is predicate P . This
must give the type of any input variables, and can also give conditions on
when the operation can be invoked. If it is invoked outside its precondition
then divergence results. Finally, the body of the operation is S . This is a
generalised substitution, which can consist of one or more assignment state-
ments (in parallel) to update the state or assign to the output variables.
Conditional statements and nondeterministic choice statements are also per-
mitted in the body of the operation. In combined communicating systems
we also define B machines that do not have operations and only contain sets,
constants and invariants. These are included in order to provide contextual
information to a system.
The language we use to describe the CSP processes for B machines is as
follows:
P ::= Stop | e?x !y ! P(x ) | P1 2 P2 | P1 u P2 |
| if b then P1 else P2 end
| P1 k P2 | P1 AkB P2 | P1 ||| P2 | N (exp)
The process Stop does not engage in any events, it represents deadlock.
The process e?x !y ! P(x ) defines a channel communication where x repre-
sents all data variables on a channel, and y represents values being passed
along a channel. Channel e is referred to as a machine channel as there is
a corresponding operation in the controlled B machine with the signature
x    e(y). Therefore the input of the B operation y corresponds to the
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output from the CSP, and the output x of the B operation to the CSP input.
Here we have simplified the communication to have one output and one input
but in general there can be any number of inputs and outputs. The external
choice, P1 2 P2, is initially prepared to behave either as P1 or as P2, with
the choice being made on occurrence of the first event in the environment.
The internal choice, P1 u P2, is similar, however, the choice is made by the
process rather than the environment. Another form of choice is controlled
by the value of a boolean expression in an if expression. The synchronous
parallel operator, P1 k P2, executes P1 and P2 concurrently, requiring them
to synchronize on all events. The alphabetized parallel operator, P1 AkB P2,
requires synchronisation only in A\B , allowing independent performance of
events outside this set. The interleaving operator, P1 ||| P2, allows concur-
rent processes to execute completely independently. Finally, N (exp) is a call
to a process where N is the process name and exp is an expression.
For reasoning with CSP||B models we require the following notation:
• A system run   (of a CSP||B model) of length n   0 is a finite sequence
  = hs0, e0, s1, e1, . . . , en 1, sni
where the si , i = 0 . . . n, are states of the B machine, and the ei , 1 
i  n 1, are events – either controlled by CSP and enabled in B when
called, or B events. Here we assume that s0 is a state after initialisation.
Given a system run  , we can extract its trace of events:
events( ) = he0, . . . , en 1i.
To demonstrate consistency of the combined CSP||B model we must
consider every sequence of events in a system run   that correspond
to a single pass through the recursive definition of the CSP processes
and verify that the matching sequence of B operations are called within
their preconditions. In [6] we provided a general proof obligation that
characterised this notion of succesful termination for sequences of op-
erations. When this obligation is discharged for a particular CSP||B
model this verifies the divergence-freedom of the combined system. In
practice the proof obligation requires the identification of a control loop
invariant which is a predicate between the variables of the B model and
the parameters within the CSP processes and also predicates which
must hold of the B model. Proof obligations in CSP||B have also been
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Figure 1: Information flow.
defined to characterise the condition for deadlock freedom [6]. In this
paper we need not concern ourselves with ensuring deadlock freedom of
the combined model since we only use events/operations which could
give rise to a deadlock in the encoding of safety in Section 3.4.
• Given a trace of events tr we define its projection to a given set A:
hi   A = hi; and
(heia t)   A =
⇢ heia (t   A) ; e 2 A
t   A ; e /2 A
3. Modelling Railways in CSP||B
Together with railway engineers, we have developed a common view of
the information flow in railways. In physical terms, a railway consists of (at
least) the four di↵erent components shown in Figure 1.
• The Controller selects and releases routes for trains.
• The Interlocking serves as a safety mechanism with regards to the Con-
troller and, in addition, controls and monitors the Track equipment.
• The Track equipment consists of elements such as signals, points, and
track circuits. Signals can show the aspects green or red ; points can be
in normal position (leading trains straight ahead) or in reverse position
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Control table
Route Normal Reverse Clear
R10A P101 AA,AB ,AC ,AD
R10B P101 AA,AB ,BC ,BD
R12 P102 AD ,AE ,AF
R112 P102 BD ,AE ,AF
Release tables
P101 Occupied P102 Occupied
R10A AC R12 AF
R10B BC R112 AF
Figure 2: Station scheme plan
(leading trains to a di↵erent line); and track circuits detect if there is
a train on a track.
• Finally, Trains have a driver who determines their behaviour.
For the purposes of modelling, we make the assumption that track equipment
reacts instantly and is free of defects.
The information flow shown in Figure 1 is as follows: the controller sends
a request message to the interlocking to which the interlocking responds;
the interlocking sends signalling information to the trains; and the trains
inform the interlocking about their movements. The interlocking serves as
the system’s clock: messages can be exchanged once per cycle.
In this paper, we study two example track plans, one of which is a sta-
tion illustrated in Figure 2, the other being a single junction illustrated in
Figure 3. In both cases, the figures depict the scheme plan for the examples,
each comprising of a track plan, a control table, and release tables. We ex-
plain our modelling approach here with reference to the station example of
Figure 2. In general, we adhere closely to the established principles laid out
in [? ]. The track plan provides the topological information of the station
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R14B P921 AI ,AJ ,BK ,BL
R16 AL,AM
R116 BL,BM
Release table
P921 Occupied
R14A AK
R14B BK
Figure 3: Single junction scheme plan
which consists of 8 tracks (e.g., the track AA), three signals (e.g., S10), and
two points (e.g., P101). Note that the tracks include entry and exit tracks
on which trains can “appear” and “disappear”. These two kinds of tracks
are specially treated during verification.
An interlocking system gathers train locations, and sends out commands
to control signal aspects and point positions. The control table determines
how the station interlocking system sets signals and points. For each signal,
there is one row describing the condition under which the signal can show
proceed. There are two rows for signal S10: one for the main line (Route
R10A) and one for the side line (Route R10B). For example, signal S10 for
the main line can only show proceed when point P101 is in normal (straight)
position and tracks AA, AB, AC, AD are all clear.
Note that we do not assume that trains are equipped with an Automatic
Train Protection system which prevents trains from moving over a red light;
thus overlaps are needed, e.g., the overlap for Route R10A is AD, and hence
AD is included in the clear table.
The interlocking also allocates locks on points to particular route requests
to keep them locked in position, and releases such locks when trains have
passed. For example, the setting of Route R10A obtains a lock on point
P101, and sets it to normal. The lock is released after the train has passed
the point. The release tables store the relevant track.
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In this setting, we consider three safety properties:
1. collision-freedom excludes two trains occupying the same track;
2. run-through says that whenever a train enters a point, the point is set
to cater for this; e.g., when a train travels from track AD to track AE,
point P102 is set so that it connects AD and AE (and not BD and AE);
3. no-derailment says that whenever a train occupies a point, the point
doesn’t move.
The correct design for the control table and release tables is safety-critical:
mistakes can lead to a violation of any of the three safety properties.
3.1. Modelling short trains
As outlined in [2], CSP||B caters for the double nature of railways by
addressing the state and data aspects separately: the interlocking as the
“data-rich” component is modelled as a single, dynamic B machine, the In-
terlocking machine. It represents the centralized control logic of a rail node,
which reacts to its environment without taking any initiative. The Interlock-
ing machine o↵ers to perform events in the form of operations to the two
active system components: the controller and the trains, both of which are
modelled as CSP processes.
The Trains and Controller processes run independently of each other, on
the CSP level expressed with an interleaving operator – see Figure 4 (lines 26
and 28). It is an internal decision of the controller which routes are requested
to be set or to be released (lines 2-4). Similarly, it is an internal decision of
the train (driver) to stay or to move in front of a green signal (lines 12-14)
or when there is no signal (line 21-23). This logic is sometimes referred to as
the driving rules of a train.
The Interlocking machine captures information about the location of
trains on tracks using the function pos : TRAIN ! ALLTRACK . The ma-
chine also captures the current information about successor tracks through a
dynamic function nextd which is dependent upon the position of the points.
Furthermore, the machine captures information about signal settings using
the function signalStatus and point settings using the sets: normalPoints
and reversePoints. Finally, the current locks on points are modelled using
currentLocks. The initial state of the model sets all tracks to being empty,
all signals to red, all points to the normal position and no locks are made on
points. This dynamic state is then updated and queried, respectively, in the
four operations of the Interlocking machine.
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1 RW CTRL =
2 ur2ROUTE (request !r?b ! RW CTRL)
3 u
4 ur2ROUTE (release!r?b ! RW CTRL)
5
6 TRAIN OFF (t) = enter !t?newp ! TRAIN CTRL(t ,newp)
7
8 TRAIN CTRL(t , pos) =
9 pos /2 EXIT ^ pos 2 SIGNALHOMES & nextSignal !t?aspect !
10 if aspect == green
11 then
12 move!t .pos?newp ! TRAIN CTRL(t ,newp)
13 u
14 stay!t .pos ! TRAIN CTRL(t , pos)
15 else
16 stay!t .pos ! TRAIN CTRL(t , pos)
17 u
18 move!t .pos?newp ! Stop
19 2
20 pos /2 EXIT ^ pos /2 SIGNALHOMES &
21 move!t .pos?newp ! TRAIN CTRL(t ,newp)
22 u
23 stay!t .pos ! TRAIN CTRL(t , pos)
24 2 . . .
25
26 ALL TRAINS =|||t2TRAIN TRAIN OFF (t)
27
28 CTRL = RW CTRL ||| ALL TRAINS
Figure 4: CSP control processes for Controller and Trains.
Figure 5 shows the full B code of a typical operation of the Interlocking
machine. It describes how a release request from the controller is processed.
The release is granted provided a number of conditions is fulfilled (the signal
of the route is green, line 6, there are points locked for the route, line 8, etc.).
In such a case, a number of state changes are made (the signal of the route
is set to red, line 16, etc.) and the controller is notified with a “yes” (line
20). Otherwise, the state does not change and the controller is notified with
a “no”.
Figure 6 shows the overall architecture of our modelling. The CSP con-
troller and the Interlockingmachine are independent of any particular scheme
plan. They are supported by a Topology, a ControlTable, a ReleaseTable, and
a Context machine. These four machines encode the scheme plan and are the
parameters in our generic approach. Seen as B machines, these four support-
ing machines are stateless, and provide generic domain definitions. A typical
example from the ControlTable machine which splits up the modelling of a
control table into two relations and one function would be given as follows:
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1 bb    release(route) =
2 PRE route 2 ROUTE THEN
3 LET emptyTracks = TRACK \ ran(pos) IN
4 IF
5 /* the signal of the route is green */
6 signalStatus(signal(route)) = green^
7 /* points locked for the route */
8 currentLocks[route] = lockTable[route]^
9 /* the route is clear */
10 clearTable(route) ✓ emptyTracks^
11 /* no train is in the track preceding the route
12 (i.e. nothing close enough to go through the red light ) */
13 homeSignal(signal(route)) 2 emptyTracks
14 THEN
15 /* signal of route to red */
16 signalStatus(signal(route)) := red ||
17 /* release the locks associated with the route */
18 currentLocks := route  C currentLocks ||
19 /* release is successful */
20 bb := yes
21 ELSE
22 bb := no
23 END
24 END
25 END
Figure 5: release operation from Interlocking.
normalTable 2 ROUTE $ POINTS ^
reverseTable 2 ROUTE $ POINTS ^
clearTable 2 ROUTE ! P(TRACK )
As the CSP||B code is easy to read and moreover short, it is actually
possible to discuss and to validate it with railway engineers. This is espe-
cially useful for discussing the algorithms underlying the four operations of
the Interlocking machine which they confirmed to be correct. On their re-
quest, we removed an event from our model that should inform the train
(driver) that there was no signal ahead. They also confirmed our insight
of the dual nature of railways by stating that they actually developed and
still use a programming language for interlockings which o↵ers primitives for
manipulating both events and states.
The predicate used to define the relationship between the Interlockingma-
chine and the CTRL process relates the train parameter t and train position
pos the TRAIN CTRL process to the pos function within the Interlocking
machine. This predicate must hold at each recursive call, and hence the
system is divergence-free.
11
CTRL
Interlocking
ControlTable Topology ReleaseTable
Context
hhhh
hhhh
hhhh
HH
HH
  
  
((((((((((((
HHHH
    
Figure 6: Architecture.
3.2. Modelling long trains
Until now we have relied on the assumption – universally, and generally
implicitly, made in railway verification – that trains are shorter than track
segments. Whilst unrealistic, this assumption allows much smaller models to
be devised and, hence, analysed. Here we provide an approach which encom-
passes train and track lengths, making no assumptions about trains having
to fit on track segments. For example, Figure 7 depicts a train spanning the
three tracks AA, AB and AC. Specifically, the front of the train sits on track
segment AC (↵ = AC), and has a distance df   0 to the next track segment
AD; and the rear of the train sits on track segment AA (rr = AA), and has
a distance dr   0 to the next track segment AB.
This approach allows fine-grained modelling of the distances that trains
travel, as well as the times it takes to do so, and we have carried out such
studies in the context of Timed CSP [11]. However, for the purposes of this
paper – that is, verifying the safety of the rail network – we restrict attention
to an untimed model in which state changes reflect the front or rear of the
train either reaching or passing the end-points of track segments. There are
thus four variables which define the state of the system: ↵ , rr , df and dr .
There are the following four situations in which a state change occurs,
depending on a mutually-exclusive partitioning of the values of the distances
df and dr . (The track segments named are in reference to Figure 7.)
(a) df=0 and dr>0. This means that the front of the train ↵ is at the
junction of two track segments (AC and AD) while the rear of the
train rr is wholly within a track segment (AA). In this instance an
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AA AB AC
rr ↵
dr df
AD
Figure 7: A long train
event move↵ .t .↵ .↵ 0 occurs representing the front of the train moving
(instantaneously) from track segment AC to track segment AD. The
new values of the state variables are ↵ 0=AD , df 0=length(AD), rr 0=rr
and dr 0=dr . (Note that this corresponds to track circuit AD changing
from “no train detected” to “train detected”.)
(b) dr>df>0. This means that the front and rear of the train are each
wholly within a track segment (the rear within AA and the front within
AC), but with the front closer to its next track segment than the rear
is to its. In this instance the state changes autonomously to that in
which the front of the train moves to the end of its track segment (ie,
the train moves forward a distance df ). The new values of the state
variables are ↵ 0=↵ , df 0=0, rr 0=rr and dr 0=dr df .
(c) df 0 and dr=0. This means that the rear of the train is at the junc-
tion of two track segments (AA and AB). In this instance an event
moverr .t .rr .rr 0 occurs representing the rear of the train t moving (in-
stantaneously) from track segment AA to track segment AB. The new
values of the state variables are ↵ 0=↵ , df 0=df , rr 0=AB and dr 0=length(AB).
(Note that this corresponds to track circuit AA changing from “train
detected” to “no train detected”.)
(d) df dr>0. This means that the front and rear of the train are each
wholly within a track segment (the rear within AA and the front within
AC), but with the rear at least as close to its next track segment as the
front is to its. In this instance the state changes autonomously to that
in which the rear of the train moves to the end of its track segment (ie,
the train moves forward a distance dr). The new values of the state
variables are ↵ 0=↵ , df 0=df dr , rr 0=rr and dr 0=0.
As a note, in a finer-grained model cases (b) and (d) above – where nei-
ther end of the train is on an end-point of a track segment – would repre-
sent states where time elapses, allowing the train to move along a distance
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d<min(df , dr), updating the state variables to be ↵ 0=↵ , df 0=df d , rr 0=rr
and dr 0=dr d .
3.3. Signals and Overlaps
Unlike in [3], we do not assume here the presence of Automatic Train
Protection (ATP) preventing trains from overrunning red signals. Rather,
we use the more realistic assumption that trains may overrun a red light but
in such instances will stop on the next track segment.
A track section immediately following a signal (an overlap section) will
therefore be protected by the signal preceding the one at the start of the
section. As we are modelling “open” networks (ie, with entry and exit tracks),
our B model will allow a train to enter an entry track only if the entry track
and its overlap track are both clear.
A move↵ event will be enabled in the first two situations above, that is if
(a) dr>df=0 or (b) dr>df>0; whereas a moverr event will be enabled in the
latter two situations, that is if (c) df dr=0, or (d) df dr>0. The driving
rules encoded into our model are then as follows:
(i) in front of a red signal, the train may either stay put, or it may overrun
by one track and then stop;
(ii) in front of a green signal, the train may either move or it may stay put.
The behaviour of the train will only be dependent on signals in situation (a),
and be modelled in CSP as follows.
1 if aspect == green
2 then
3 move↵ !t .↵ ?↵ 0 ! TRAIN CTRL(t ,↵ 0, length(↵ 0), rr , dr)
4 u
5 stay.t ! TRAIN CTRL(t ,↵ , df , rr , dr)
6 else (⇤ aspect == red ⇤)
7 stay.t ! TRAIN CTRL(t ,↵ , df , rr , dr)
8 u
9 move↵ .t .↵ .↵ 0 ! Stop
3.4. Encoding safety
We describe here how the three safety properties are encoded in our B
machine. Firstly, a collision is encoded as follows.
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1 collision =
2 SELECT
3 9 t1, t2 2 TRAIN : t1 6= t2 ^ (ran(pos(t1)) \ ran(pos(t2))) \ (EXIT [ ENTRY ) = ;
4 THEN skip
5 END;
Here collision is detected when two di↵erent trains t1 and t2 occupy the
same track segment (di↵erent from the EXIT and ENTRY tracks). This is
recognised in the pos function which maps trains to the track segments they
occupy; the collision condition will be enabled when the pos sets of the two
trains have a nonempty intersection.
Next, run-through is modelled as follows.
1 runthrough =
2 SELECT 9 t 2 TRAIN ^ t 2 dom(pos) ^ nullTrack 2 ran(pos(t))
3 THEN skip
4 END;
Here run-through is detected when a train t occupies nullTrack which is a
special track segment introduced in our CSP model onto which a train is sent
when it travels over an incorrectly-set point.
Finally, derailment is modelled as follows.
1 derailment =
2 SELECT ran(union(ran(pos))) \ homePoints[movedPoints] 6= ;
3 THEN skip
4 END;
Here derailment is detected when the set of track segments currently occupied
by trains includes segments which are associated with points that have moved
while the trains have been on these segments.
The complete CSP||B models for both case studies can be downloaded
from http://www.cs.swan.ac.uk/RAIL/Models/CSPB.
4. Finitisation
In the following, we develop a theory of how to reduce the problem of
verifying our CSP||B models of scheme plans for safety (i.e., freedom from
collision, derailment, and run-through) to that of the two-train scenario.
Given a scheme plan SP , and an unlimited collection TRAIN of trains with
a function length : TRAIN ! N that assigns a length to each train, we write
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CSP ||B(SP ,TRAIN ) for the instantiation of our generic CSP||B model with
SP and TRAIN . Note that in general CSP || B(SP ,TRAIN ) is an infinite
state system due to the inclusion of train identifiers into events and states.
We call our theory “finitisation”, as it reduces the safety problem over an
infinite state system to a safety problem over a finite state system, namely to
CSP ||B(SP ,TRAIN ) where the set of TRAIN contains two elements only.
Finitisation requires scheme plans to fulfil a number of well-formedness
conditions as outlined in Section 4.1. For well-formed scheme plans we es-
tablish in Section 4.2 a reduction theorem (Theorem 3) w.r.t. the number of
trains involved in a system run. If we are only interested in the movements
of a finite set of trains in a given system run – say in the movements of two
trains which collide in this system run – then we can define a new system
run with “exactly the same movements” for just this selected set of trains.
Finitisation works for well-formed scheme plans as it is possible to simulate
the influence that one train can have on other trains by suitable route request
and route release commands. The validity of this finitisation argument for
safety is demonstrated in Section 4.3.
4.1. Well-formedness conditions
In our modelling approach, track plans are encoded in the Context and
in the Topology machines in B . In these machines, tracks are collected in a
set TRACK with special sets ENTRY ,EXIT ✓ TRACK for the entry and
exit tracks. Signals are collected in a set SIGNAL; homeSignal : SIGNAL!
TRACK defines the unique track at which a signal is placed; and the con-
nectivity is given by a relation next ✓ TRACK ⇥TRACK . One can see this
structure as a directed graph (TRACK , next) with signals as labels on the
nodes. With this notation, we define the concept of a topological route as
a path through this graph, which begins after a signal and ends either with
the track after the next signal or before an exit track.
Definition 1. A topological route is a path R = ht1, . . . , tki 2 TRACK+,
k   1, in the graph (TRACK , next) such that the following holds:
• there is a signal s 2 SIGNAL and a track t 2 TRACK such that
homeSignal(s) = t and (t , t1) 2 next, and
• either there is a signal s 2 Signal such that homeSignal(s) = tk 1 and
for all 1  i  k 2 and s 2 SIGNAL it holds that homeSignal(s) 6= ti ;
or there is a track t 2 EXIT such that (tk , t) 2 next and for all 1 
i  k and s 2 SIGNAL it holds that homeSignal(s) 6= ti .
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A track t belongs to a topological route R, written as t 2 R, i↵ t = ti for
some 1  i  k. TopoRoute denotes the set of all topological routes of a
track plan.
In Figure 2, the path hAA,AB ,AC ,ADi is a topological route from
the first track after signal S10 to the first track after signal S12; the path
hAD ,AE ,AF i is a topological route from signal S10 to the track just before
the exit track Exit .
When designing a scheme plan, the signalling engineer selects and names
some of the topological routes and develops control and release tables for
them, i.e., there is a set ROUTE of route names and an injective map topo :
ROUTE ! TopoRoute which assigns a topological route to each route name.
Definition 2. A scheme plan is well-formed if the following conditions hold:
1. (Release-Table condition) Locks of a route can only be released by a
train movement on that route:
8 r 2 ROUTE , p 2 POINT , t 2 TRACK :
(r , p) 2 releaseTable(t)) t 2 topo(r)
2. (Clear-Table condition) The clear table of a route contains at least the
tracks of this route:
8 r 2 ROUTE : {t | t 2 topo(r)} ✓ clearTable(r)
3. (Normal/Reverse-Table condition) Every point on a route is in either
the normal table or the reverse table of that route:
8 r 2 ROUTE : {p 2 POINT | homePoint(p) 2 topo(r)}
✓ normalTable(r) [ reverseTable(r)
4. (Route condition) Topologically di↵erent routes that share some points
are distinguishable by at least one point position of these shared points:
8 r1, r2 2 ROUTE : r1 6= r2 ^ sharedPoints(r1, r2) 6= ; )
(9 p 2 sharePoints(r1, r2) :
(p 2 reverseTable(r1) ^ p 2 normalTable(r2)) _
(p 2 reverseTable(r2) ^ p 2 normalTable(r1)))
The above conditions ensure a minimal consistency between the signalling
of routes in the control and release tables on the one hand, and their topolog-
ical extent as defined by the railway topology on the other hand. As demon-
strated by the following example, however, this consistency is not enough to
ensure safety.
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Example 1. Consider the following changes to the control table of the scheme
plan shown in Figure 2: for route R10A set point P101 to be “reverse”
rather than “normal”, for route R10B set point P101 to be “normal” rather
than “reverse”. In this changed setting all four conditions are fulfilled. The
changed scheme plan however is not safe as trains can collide on track BC :
Let there be no train in the beginning. Then route R10A can be set, and a
train can travel from Entry over AA and AB to BC and stay on track BC .
As BC is not in the clear part of route R10A, and there are no trains on
the track named in the clear part of R10A, route R10A can be set again, and
another train can travel along the same way. This second train will collide
with the first one on track BC .
4.2. A reduction theory
We start the development of our reduction theory with a simple observa-
tion on our CSP||B models. If a signal shows green in a state of a system
run, then there exists a uniquely determined route for which in the past a
route request must have been granted by the interlocking.
Theorem 1. Let   be a system run of CSP ||B(SP ,TRAIN ) for a scheme
plan SP and a set of trains TRAIN . Then the following holds for all signals
sig 2 SIGNAL : prior to a state in which sig shows green, there is a uniquely
determined event request .r .yes, r 2 ROUTE , in   that caused the signal to
become green. We sometimes speak of the uniquely determined route r that
has been granted.
Proof. By definition of the B machine Interlocking , a signal is set to green
only by the event request (when a route is successfully requested). Conversely,
a signal is set to red only by the events move↵ and release (when a train
passes a signal and when a route is released successfully).
Let Sn , n   0, be a state of   in which sig is green. Then, prior to Sn ,
there must have been a last successful request to one of the routes r with
signal(r) = s (in S0, all signals show red). Moreover, after this request no
train can have passed sig and there cannot have been a successful attempt
to release r . Thus, the system run   up to state Sn has the following form:
S0, e0, S1, . . . , Sk 1, request .r .yes , Sk , ek , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , en ,| {z }
ei 6= move↵ .id .tsig .nsig ,
ei 6= release.r .yes
Sn
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where signalStatusSn (sig) = green, signalHome(sig) = tsig , (tsig , nsig) 2 next ,
and id is a train identifier. Furthermore, any event between ek and en inclu-
sively cannot be request .r 0.yes for a route r 0 2 ROUTE with signal(r 0) = sig .
This is the case, as one condition in request .r 0.yes requires signalStatus(sig) =
red . Hence, no other route which shares this signal is set from Sk to Sn .
In the following we show that for every system run   involving a set A]B
of trains there exists a system run  0 which involves trains only from A, and
where the trains from A move identically to  . I.e., if trains from A collide
in   they collide in  0, if a train in A derails in  , it derails in  0, if a train
has a run-through in  , the same happens in  0. We obtain  0 constructively
by defining a replacement function on events. To this end, we first identify
those events which are related to B :
Definition 3. Given a B be a set of train identifiers, we define the events
of B as
E (B) = {enter .b | b 2 B} [
{exit .b | b 2 B} [
{nextSignal .b | b 2 B} [
{move↵ .b.cp.np | b 2 B ^ cp, np 2 ALLTRACK} [
{moverr .b.cp.np | b 2 B ^ cp, np 2 ALLTRACK}
The next step is to define the replacement function. This function is
dependent on the current state as well:
replaceB(S , e) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
e e /2 B
release.r .yes e = move↵ .b.cp.np ^
9 s 2 SIGNAL : homeSignal(s) = cp ^
signalStatusS (s) = green ^
9!r 2 ROUTE : signal(r) = s ^
currentLocksS (r) = lockTable(r)
idle otherwise
In the context of a system run, Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of a
unique route r to be released, when we want to replace a forward move
move↵ .b.cp.np in front of a green signal by a route release release.r .yes .
Removing the trains in the set B from a system run also e↵ects the states
of the B machine. For example, one component of a B machine state S is
the map posS : TRAIN ! ALLTRACK+, which stores for each train the
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sequence of tracks it occupies. If we now remove the trains B , we would
hope that for the corresponding state T the following relation holds: posT =
posS \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+. In general, this correspondence between states is
not only a projection on the the remaining trains. We define:
Definition 4. Let S and T be states of the B machine of CSP ||B(SP ,TRAINS ),
let B ✓ TRAINS be a set of trains. State T is in B -correspondence to state
S, written T B S , i↵ the following nine conditions are fulfilled:
posT = posS \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ (1)
nextdT = nextdS (2)
signalStatusT = signalStatusS (3)
normalPointsT = normalPointsS (4)
reversePointsT = reversePointsS (5)
movedPointsT = movedPointsS (6)
(currentLocksT [{r}] = currentLocksS [{r}] _
currentLocksT [{r}] = ;) for all r 2 ROUTE (7)
signalStatusS (s) = green ) 9!r 2 ROUTE : signal(r) = s ^
currentLocksS (r) = lockTable(r) ^
currentLocksT (r) = lockTable(r)
for all s 2 SIGNAL (8)
t 2 posS (b)) 8 r 2 ROUTE : t 2 topo(r)
) currentLocksT (r) = ;
for all b 2 B (9)
Condition (1) is as expected: the trains in the set B have been removed.
Conditions (2) to (6) state that point positions and signal aspects are identi-
cal. Condition (7) states that the run without the trains in the set B either
has the same locks for a route or none at all. Condition (8) stipulates that
if a signal is green, there exists one route associated with the signal which
is set. Finally, condition (9) says that the locks of any route that contains
a track segment occupied by a train b 2 B in state S have been released in
state T .
With these notations, we want to establish the following simulation prop-
erties: (a) Given a state S , a state T with T B S , and an event e that
is enabled in S we want that replaceS (e) is enabled in T 0. Furthermore, we
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want that (b) the resulting states S 0 and T 0 to be in B correspondence, i.e.,
T 0 B S 0. The following diagram illustrates this situation:
S e S 0
 B  B
T replaceS (e) T 0
We establish these two properties in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Given a scheme plan SP, a set of trains TRAIN , a subset of
trains B ✓ TRAIN and a system run   of CSP || B(SP ,TRAIN ) where
trains in B do not cause collision, then replaceB( ) is a system run of the B
machine of CSP ||B(SP ,TRAIN \ B).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of  . The base case is trivial,
and the induction cases are generally unproblematic. However, due to the
sheer number of cases to consider, the proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Lemma 1 allows us to extend the function replaceB to system runs   =
hS0, e1,T1, . . . , ek , Ski as follows:
replaceB( ) = hT0, replaceB(S0, e1),T1, . . . , replaceB(Sk 1, ek),Tki
Here T0 = S0 (the initial state). Lemma 1 guarantees that it holds for all
1  i  k : replaceB(Si 1, ei) is enabled in Ti 1 and leads to Ti and Ti  Si .
With this result in place, we focus now on the question, if the events of
replaceB( ) give a trace of the CSP controller:
Lemma 2. Given a scheme plan SP, a set of trains TRAIN , a subset of
trains B ✓ TRAIN and a system run   of CSP || B(SP ,TRAIN ) where
trains in B do not cause collision, then events(replaceB( )) is a trace of the
CSP controller CTRL(SP ,TRAIN \ B).
Proof. Let   be a system run of CSP ||B(SP ,TRAIN ) and let  0 = replaceB( ).
As   is a system run, events( ) is a trace of CTRL(SP ,TRAIN ). Recall that
CTRL(SP ,TRAIN ) = RW (SP) ||| TRAIN CTRL(TRAIN ) |||
ERR ||| IDLE
TRAIN CTRL(TRAIN ) = |||
i2TRAIN TRAIN OFF (i)
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As the alphabets of the processes RW ( ), TRAIN CTRL( ), ERR and
IDLE are disjoint, we can analyze the situation for the trace events( 0) by
projection on these alphabets.
First note that for the original trace we have that events( )   E ({i}) 2
traces(TRAIN OFF (i)) for all i 2 TRAIN . Here, E ({i}) is the set of events
associated with train i , see Definition 3, and   is the projection function
defined in Section 2. With this result we obtain
• events( 0)   E ({b}) = hi ✓ traces(TRAIN OFF (i)) (since we replace
all events related to b 2 B) and
• events( 0)   E ({i}) = events( )   E ({i}) 2 traces(TRAIN OFF (i))
where i /2 B (since we keep all events related to i /2 B).
From the definitions of RW (SP),ERROR and IDLE , it follows directly
that
• events( 0)   {| request , release |} 2 traces(RW (SP)) and
• events( 0)   {| collision, derailment , runthrough |} 2 traces(RW (SP)).
Therefore, events( 0) 2 CTRL(SP ,TRAIN \ B).
Combining our two lemmas results in the following result.
Theorem 2. Given a scheme plan SP, a set of trains TRAIN , a subset
of trains B ✓ TRAIN and a system run   of CSP ||B(SP ,TRAIN ) where
trains in B do not cause collision, then replaceB( ) is a system run of CSP ||
B(SP ,TRAIN \ B).
Proof. Let   be a system run of CSP ||B(SP ,TRAIN ). By Lemma 1 we know
that replaceB( ) is a run of the B machine M of CSP || B(SP ,TRAIN \
B), and we especially have events(replaceB( )) 2 traces(M ). By Lemma
2 we know that replaceB( ) 2 tracesCTRL(SP ,TRAIN ). Thus, by defi-
nition of the semantics of CSP||B, replaceB( ) is a system run of CSP ||
B(SP ,TRAIN \ B).
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4.3. Verification for safety
Our verification approach for CSP||B is to use model checking withProB,
where we check that in a given model a specific error event does not happen,
i.e., it is never enabled.
Safety in the models with long trains is dependent on the train length
involved, which motivates the following definition.
Definition 5. Let ERROR = {collision, derailment , runthrough} be the set
of error events of interest. Let L ✓ N be a set of possible train lengths:
1. Let n 2 N>0 be a non-zero number of trains and e 2 ERROR.
A scheme plan SP is (n,L) e-free i↵ for all   2 CSP ||B(SP ,TRAIN )
it holds that e is not enabled in any state of   where |TRAIN | = n and
{length(t) | t 2 TRAIN } = L.
2. A scheme plan SP is L-safe i↵ SP is (n,L) e-free for any n 2 N>0 and
and e 2 ERROR.
Note that our definition of (n,L) e-free requires that 1  |L|  n.
We can now turn Theorem 2 into a proof method. The following Corollary
is the basis of the main theoretical result of this paper.
Corollary 1. Let L ✓ N be a set of possible train lengths. If a scheme plan
SP is
1. (2,L0) collision-free for all L0 ✓ L, 1 | L0 | 2, and
2. (1,L0) derailment-free for all L0 ✓ L, | L0 |= 1, and
3. (1,L0) run-through-free for all L0 ✓ L, | L0 |= 1,
then SP is L-safe.
Proof. Assume that SP is not L-safe. This means there exists n 2 N>0 and
e 2 ERROR such that SP is not (n,L) e-free. Then, there exists a run   of
CSP ||B(SP ,TRAIN ), |TRAIN | = n, such that e is enabled in some state
of  .
Let   = hS0, e1, S1, . . . , ek , Ski. Without loss of generality, let us assume
that
e is enabled in Sk (10)
8 e 0 2 ERROR : e 0 is not enable in S0, . . . , Sk 1 (11)
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Case 1: e = collision.
(10) ) 9 t1, t2 2 TRAIN , t 2 TRACK : t 2 posSk (t1) ^ t 2 posSk (t2)
) ek is a move↵ of t1 or t2 by (11)
) trains in TRAIN \ {t1, t2} do not cause collision in  
) replaceTRAIN\{t1,t2}( ) is a run of CSP ||B(SP , {t1, t2})
by Theorem 2
) Tk TRAIN\{t1,t2} Sk
where Tk is the last state in replaceTRAIN\{t1,t2}( )
) t 2 posTk (t1) ^ t 2 posTk (t2)
) collision is enabled inTk
) SP is not (2, {length(t1), length(t2)}) collision-free
Case 2: e = derailment .
(10) ) 9 t 2 TRAIN , p 2 movedPointsSk : homePoint(p) 2 posSk (t)
) ek is a request .r .yes by (11)
) trains in TRAIN do not cause collision in  
) replaceTRAIN\{t}( ) is a run of CSP ||B(SP , {t1, t2})
by Theorem 2
) Tk TRAIN\{t} Sk
where Tk is the last state in replaceTRAIN\{t1,t2}( )
) p 2 movedPointTk ^ homePoint(p) 2 posTk (t)
) derailment is enabled inTk
) SP is not (1, {length(t)}) derailment-free
Case 2: e = run-through.
(10) ) 9 t 2 TRAIN : nullTrack 2 posSk (t)
) ek is a move↵ of t by (11)
) trains in TRAIN do not cause collision in  
) replaceTRAIN\{t}( ) is a run of CSP ||B(SP , {t1, t2})
by Theorem 2
) Tk TRAIN\{t} Sk
where Tk is the last state in replaceTRAIN\{t1,t2}( )
) nullTrack 2 posTk (t)
) run-through is enabled inTk
) SP is not (1, {length(t)}) run-through-free
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Corollary 1 works with di↵erent numbers of trains: two trains are needed
in the case of collision, one train is needed otherwise. In order to be able to
check safety for all three properties in one go, we prove the following.
Theorem 3. If a scheme plan SP is (n,L) e-free then SP is (n 0,L0) e-free
for n 0 < n and L0 ✓ L.
Proof. Assume SP is not (n 0,L0) e-safe, then there exists a run   2 CSP ||
B(SP ,TRAIN 0), |TRAIN 0| = n 0, such that e is enabled in some state of
 . Then,   is also a run of CSP || B(SP ,TRAIN ), TRAIN 0 ✓ TRAIN ,
|TRAIN | = n and L0 ✓ L = {length(t) | t 2 TRAIN }.
5. Experimental results
In this section we outline various experimental results carried out on our
models. We used the ProB tool to check the validity of the following CTL
formula:
AG(not(e(collision) _ e(runthrough) _ e(derailment)))
This formula is false if one of our ERROR events is enabled. In the CTL
variant of ProB AG stands for “on all path is it globally true”, e(a) stands
for the enabledness of the event a.
5.1. Demonstration of errors
In order to demonstrate possible errors in a scheme plan, we provide two
counter examples from the verification of the Station case study, presented
in Figure 2, where the control table is deliberately changed to contain errors.
In these cases, counter examples are provided by ProB in terms of traces
which contain an event from {collision, derailment , run-through}.
Example 2. In the first experiment, we swap the position of point P101 for
routes R10A (to reverse) and R10B (to normal) - like in Example 1 above.
For this, ProB provides the following counter example:
henter .albert .Entry, request .R10A.yes, nextSignal .albert .green,
move↵ .albert .Entry .AA, moverr .albert .Entry .AA, move↵ .albert .AA.AB,
move↵ .albert .AB .BC, moverr .albert .AA.AB, moverr .albert .AB .BC,
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enter .bertie.Entry, request .R10A.yes, nextSignal .bertie.green,
move↵ .bertie.Entry .AA, moverr .bertie.Entry .AA, move↵ .bertie.AA.AB,
move↵ .bertie.AB .BC, collisioni
which illustrates a collision caused by albert and bertie at BC .
Example 3. In the second experiment, we swap the position of point P102
for routes R12 (to reverse) and R112 (to normal). For this, ProB provides
the following counter example:
henter .albert .Entry, request .R10A.yes, nextSignal .albert .green,
move↵ .albert .Entry .AA, moverr .albert .Entry .AA, move↵ .albert .AA.AB,
move↵ .albert .AB .AC, moverr .albert .AA.AB, moverr .albert .AB .AC,
request .R12.yes, move↵ .albert .AC .AD, moverr .albert .AC .AD,
move↵ .albert .AD .nullTrack, run-throughi
which illustrates a run-through caused by albert.
5.2. Verification of the case studies
In this section we report on the verification results for safety of the single
junction and station case studies. The experiments were carried out using
ProB 1.3.6-final [12] to verify the collision, run-through and derailment free-
dom using CTL model checking over the CSP||B models. The models are
built using our modelling approach as described in Section 3 where train and
track lengths are taken into account. Thanks to the finitisation technique
developed in Section 4, the CSP||B model of each case study requires only
two trains for the verification of safety. In our example, we assume that
train lengths can be either 40m (i.e., consisting of two coaches, each being
20m long) or 200m (i.e., consisting of ten coaches). To this end, for each case
study, we performed three experiments which cover all possible combinations
of train lengths from {40m, 200m}. The experiments were conducted on a
PC with a quad-core 3.2GHz CPU and 8GB memory. The results are sum-
marised in Figure 8 where for each experiment of a train length combination
we report the number of states in the state space, the number of transitions
in the state space, the size of used memory and the total running time.
Figure 9 shows the verification results for the same case studies with-
out modelling lengths. In these experiments, we consider two trains in the
CSP||B models of the Station and the Single Junction case studies. Since
train and track lengths are not included in the CSP||B models, only one ex-
periment is carried out for each case study. These results show that the sizes
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Plan Train Length States ⇡ Transitions ⇡ Size Time
Station 40m, 40m 9093 88702 186.5 MB 15m 13s
40m, 200m 8931 78626 182.1 MB 15m 10s
200m, 200m 8769 78596 181.7 MB 15m 04s
Junction 40m, 40m 64733 896812 612.3 MB 1m 22s
40m, 200m 64285 897052 611.1 MB 1m 20s
200m, 200m 63837 883000 604.6 MB 1m 19s
Figure 8: Verification results of the Station and the Single Junction.
Plan States ⇡ Transitions ⇡ Size Time
Station 6185 63508 176.8 MB 54.7s
Junction 51961 751225 606.2 MB 11m 36s
Figure 9: Verification results without lengths.
of the CSP||B models increase when we take lengths of trains and tracks into
account in our modelling approach.
6. Related work
The railway interlocking problem has long been studied by the Formal
Methods community, and our work builds upon prior approaches to the mod-
elling and verification of railways. Prominent studies from the B community
include [13, 14, 15] whilst [16, 17] are classical contributions from process
algebra and [18] uses techniques from Algebraic Specification. On a lower
abstraction layer, [19, 20, 21, 22] verify the safety of interlocking programs
with logical approaches.
6.1. Modelling comparison
Our modelling is most related to Winter’s approach in CSP [23] and
Abrial’s modelling in Event-B [24]. In the following we briefly discuss their
respective approaches and the manner in which we consider our approach
to succeed in combining the successful aspects of these whilst avoiding their
perceived deficiencies.
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Winter [23] presents a generic, event-based railway model in CSP as
well as generic formulations of two safety properties: CollisionFreedom and
NoMovingPoints. Overall, this results in a generic architecture and a natu-
ral representation of two safety properties. Traceability, however, is limited.
There are relations in the model which are derived from the control table.
For example, the driving rule “trains stop at a red signal” is distributed over
di↵erent parts of the model: it is a consequence of the fact that (1) the
event “move to the first track protected by a signal” belongs to a specific
synchronziation set and (2) a red signal does not o↵er this event. Purely
event-based modelling leads to such decentralized control. Consequently, the
model has no interlocking cycle.
Chapter 17 of the book by Abrial [24] gives an excellent detailed de-
scription and analysis of the railway domain, deriving a total of 39 di↵erent
requirements. The modelling approach is generic, even though no concrete
model is proven to be correct. Traceability in a tower of specifications can
be complex for various reasons. For instance, a requirement can be the con-
sequence of invariants from di↵erent levels. The relation between intended
properties and the model remains an informal one. This is in contrast to
other approaches (including Winter’s and our own) which directly represent
the intended property in the formal world and then prove that the modelled
property is a mathematical consequence of the formal model. Furthermore,
the approach is monolithic: behaviour is not attached to di↵erent entities to
which they relate.
Winter et al. [7] allows a train to occupy two track segments, which is
a concession to the assumption made elsewhere (including in our previous
studies) that a train can only occupy one track segment. However, we noted
in [2] that even this concession is too restrictive to be realistic. It is one of
the novelties of our approach here that this assumption is discharged. The
other novelty is the discharging of the assumption that only a very few trains
my enter the network. This assumption is traditionally used to keep the
state space of the analyses under control, with tools being stretched to allow
the possibility of ever more trains running through the network. Using our
approach, this assumption is no longer required, at least for safety analysis.
6.2. Verification comparison
The focus of our paper has been on safety verification using model check-
ing in ProB. Model checking is becoming more recognised as an industrial
28
technique [25] and therefore it is important to discuss it in the context of scal-
ability. Ferrari et al. [19] state that model checking large interlocking systems
is unfeasible with current state-of-the-art model checkers, in particular SPIN
and NuSMV. However, Cimatti et al. [22] have demonstrated considerable
success using NuSMV on industrial scale problems. James et al. [21] also
demonstrate better results and the feasibility of the lower level approach in-
volving program slicing. A detailed comparison with these approaches is not
appropriate since our approach is at a higher level of abstraction. The justifi-
cation for this higher level of abstraction is that the industrial partners wish
to have feedback on interlocking systems already during the design stage.
7. Conclusion and future work
Through our association with Invensys Rail, we are working towards de-
riving railway models which are formal and analysable by current verification
technologies, yet are fully faithful; we do not want to hide the engineering
understandings held by our industrial partners in clever abstract encodings.
Despite being expressed in the mathematical language of formal methods,
our models must be immediately understandable — and verifiable — by our
industrial partners.
This has proven to be a challenge, as we find that the extant approaches
to railway modelling have been hindered in this respect by the framework
in which they have been carried out. As explained above, modelling in the
railway domain involves event-based components as well as state-based com-
ponents. Using a solely-event-based framework or a solely-state-based frame-
work succeeds in faithfully representing the relevant components, yet su↵ers
in representing other components through encodings which — whilst clever
feats of abstract modelling — are not easily appreciated by the working rail-
way engineer.
Beyond the challenge of faithfully modelling railway systems, we have
devised abstraction techniques that yield an e↵ective and e cient verification
process based on model checking. In particular, ... We illustrated this process
in terms of various scenarios.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
Base case:
It requires to shows that T0 B S0. After initialisation, we have
posX = ;
nextdX = staticNext [ dynamicNext [POINT ⇥ {normal}]
signalStatusX = SIGNAL⇥ {red}
normalPointsX = POINT
reversePointsX = ;
movedPointsX = ;
currentLocksX = ;
for any X 2 {T0, S0}. Hence, it is straightforward that T0 B S0.
Induction step:
Assume that T B S and S e S 0. We have to show that e 0 = replaceB(e)
is enabled in T and T e 0 T 0 implies that T 0 B S 0. This is done by consid-
ering all possible cases of e (as outlined in the model).
• Case e = move↵ .x .cp.np and x /2 B , then e 0 = move↵ .x .cp.np.
e 0 is enabled in T :
e is enabled in S ) x 2 dom(posS ) ^
cp = first(posS (x ))
) x 2 dom(posT ) ^ by (1) and x /2 B
cp = first(posT (x )) by (1) and x /2 B
) e 0 is enabled in T
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change pos(x ) signalStatus(s) (if homeSignal(s) =
cp), and movedPoints , we only show (1), (3)and(6):
posT 0(x ) = hnpia posT (x ) by move↵ .x .cp.np
= hnpia posS (x ) by (1) and x /2 B
= posS 0(x ) by move↵ .x .cp.np
signalStatusT 0(s) = red if cp = homeSignal(s)
= signalStatusS 0(s) by move↵ .x .cp.np
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movedPointsT 0 = ; by move↵ .x .cp.np
= movedPointsS 0(s) by move↵ .x .cp.np
• Case e = move↵ .x .cp.np, x 2 B , and cp /2 ran(homeSignal), then e 0 =
idle.
e 0 is trivially enabled in T .
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change pos(x ) and movedPoints , we only
show (1)and(6):
posT 0 = posT by idle
= posS \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by (1)
= posS \ {x}⇥ ALLTRACK+ [ {x 7! hnpia posS (x )}\
B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by move↵ .x .cp.np
= posS 0(x ) \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ since x 2 B
movedPointsT 0 = ; by idle
= movedPointsS 0(s) by move↵ .x .cp.np
• Case e = move↵ .x .cp.np, x 2 B , and cp = homeSignal(s), for some s 2
SIGNAL and statusSignalS (s) = red , then e 0 = idle.
e 0 is trivially enabled in T .
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change pos(x ) and movedPoints , we only
show (1)and(6):
posT 0 = posT by idle
= posS \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by (1)
= posS \ {x}⇥ ALLTRACK+ [ {x 7! hnpia posS (x )}\
B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by move↵ .x .cp.np
= posS 0(x ) \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ since x 2 B
movedPointsT 0 = ; by idle
= movedPointsS 0(s) by move↵ .x .cp.np
• Case e = move↵ .x .cp.np, x 2 B , and cp = homeSignal(s), for some s 2
SIGNAL such that signalStatusS (s) = green, then e 0 = release.r .yes
where r is uniquely determined by (8).
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e 0 is enabled in T since:
signalStatusT (s) = signalStatusS (s) by (3)
= green
currentLocksT (r) = lockTable(r) by (8)
homeSignal(s) 2 emtpyTracksT
as (1) and x 2 B (no collision)
imply only x occupies homeSignal(s)
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change pos(x ) signalStatus(s), and
movedPoints , we only show (1), (3) and (6):
posT 0 = posT by release.r .yes
= posS \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by (1)
= posS \ {x}⇥ ALLTRACK+ [ {x 7! hnpia posS (x )}\
B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by move↵ .x .cp.np
= posS 0(x ) \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ since x 2 B
signalStatusT 0(s) = red = signalStatusS 0(s) by move↵ .x .cp.np
movedPointsT 0 = ; by release.r .yes
= movedPointsS 0(s) by move↵ .x .cp.np
• Case e = moverr .x .cp.np and x /2 B , then e 0 = moverr .x .cp.np.
e 0 is enabled in T :
e is enabled in S ) x 2 dom(posS ) ^
cp = last(posS (x ))
) x 2 dom(posT ) ^ by (1) and x /2 B
cp = last(posT (x )) by (1) and x /2 B
) e 0 is enabled in T
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change pos(x ), movedPoints and currentLocks ,
we only show (1), (6)and(7):
posT 0(x ) = front(posT (x )) by moverr .x .cp.np
= front(posS (x )) by (1) and x /2 B
= posS 0(x ) by moverr .x .cp.np
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movedPointsT 0 = ; by moverr .x .cp.np
= movedPointsS 0(s) by moverr .x .cp.np
currentLocksT 0 = currentLocksT \ releaseTable(np)
by moverr .x .cp.np
= currentLocksS \ releaseTable(np) or
; \ releaseTable(np)
= currentLocksS 0 or ;
• Case e = moverr .x .cp.np and x 2 B , then e 0 = idle.
e 0 is trivially enabled in T .
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change pos(x ), movedPoints and currentLocks ,
we only show (1), (6)and(7):
posT 0 = posT by idle
= posS \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by (1)
= posS \ {x}⇥ ALLTRACK+ [ {x 7! front(posS (x ))}\
B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by moverr .x .cp.np
= posS 0 \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ since x 2 B
movedPointsT 0 = ; by idle
= movedPointsS 0(s) by moverr .x .cp.np
For (7), we have:
currentLocksT 0 = currentLocksT
by idle
currentLocksS 0 = currentLocksS \ releaseTable(np)
by idle
For any (r , p) 2 releaseTable(np), we have that np 2 topo(r) by
assumption 1. Furthermore, np 2 posS (x ), by (9), we have that
currentLocksT (r) = ;, hence currentLocksT 0(r) = ;.
The event of this case moves the rear of a train in B , hence, no signal
changes from red to green, then (8) follows immediate; and it is not
moved into a new route, then, (9) holds for S 0 and T 0.
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• Case e = request .r .yes , then e 0 = request .r .yes .
e 0 is enabled in T :
e is enabled in S ) clearTable(r) ✓ emptyTracksS ^
signalStatusS (signal(r)) = red ^
normalTable(r) ✓ normalPointsS [ unlockedPointsS ^
reverseTable(r) ✓ reversePointsS [ unlockedPointsS
) clearTable(r) ✓ emptyTracksT ^
as (1) implies emptyTracksS ✓ emptyTracksT
signalStatusT (signal(r)) = red ^ by (3)
normalTable(r) ✓ normalPointsT [ unlockedPointsT ^
by (4) and (7)
reverseTable(r) ✓ reversePointsT [ unlockedPointsT
by (5) and (7)
) e 0 is enabled in T
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change signalStatus(signal(r)), normalPoints ,
reversePoints , movedPoints , and currentLocks(r), we only show (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8):
signalStatusT 0(signal(r)) = green = signalStatusS 0(signal(r))
by request .r .yes
normalPointsT 0 = normalPointsT [ normalTable[{r}] \ reverseTable[{r}]
by request .r .yes
= normalPointsS [ normalTable[{r}] \ reverseTable[{r}]
by (4)
= normalPointsS 0 by request .r .yes
reversePointsT 0 = reversePointsT [ reverseTable[{r}] \ normalTable[{r}]
by request .r .yes
= reversePointsS [ reverseTable[{r}] \ normalTable[{r}]
by (4)
= reversePointsS 0 by request .r .yes
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movedPointsT 0 = (normalPointsT \ normalPointsT 0)[
(reversePointsT \ reversePointsT 0)
by request .r .yes
= (normalPointsS \ normalPointsS 0)[
by (4) and above
(reversePointsS \ reversePointsS 0)
by (4) and above
= movedPointsS 0 by request .r .yes
currentLocksT 0 [{r}] = currentLocksT [{r}] [ lockTable[{r}]
by request .r .yes
= lockTable[{r}]
since r locks at most lockTable[{r}]
For (8), the existence is immediate by r . The uniqueness follows from
Assumptions (3) and (4) that it is not possible to have 2 routes sharing
signals since they must share points and the locks on these points must
be di↵erent.
For (9), any route r 0 such that t 2 topo(r 0) cannot be requested in
S and T since assumption 2 and the fact that there is a train on its
topology. Hence, r 0 6= r , i.e., we do not change the locks by r 0 in S 0.
• Case e = enter .x .t and x /2 B , then e 0 = enter .x .t .
e 0 is enabled in T :
e is enabled in S ) x /2 dom(posS ) ^
t 2 ENTRY ^
nextdS (t) 2 emptyTracksS
) x /2 dom(posT ) ^ by (1)
t 2 ENTRY ^
nextdT (t) 2 emptyTracksT by (1) and (2)
) e 0 is enabled in T
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change pos and movedPoints , we only
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show (1) and (7):
posT 0 = posT [ {x 7! hti} by enter
= posS \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ [ {x 7! hti} by (1)
= posS [ {x 7! hti} \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ as x /2 B
= posS 0 \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by enter
movedPointsT 0 = ; by enter
= movedPointsS 0 by enter
• Case e = enter .x .t and x 2 B , then e 0 = idle.
e 0 is obviously enabled in T .
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change pos and movedPoints , we only
show (1) and (7):
posT 0 = posT by idle
= posS \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by (1)
= posS [ {x 7! hti} \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ as x 2 B
= posS 0 \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by enter
movedPointsT 0 = ; by idle
= movedPointsS 0 by enter
• Case e = exit .x .t and x /2 B , then e 0 = exit .x .t .
e 0 is enabled in T :
e is enabled in S ) posS (x ) = hti ^
t 2 EXIT
) posT (x ) = hti ^ by (1) and x /2 B
t 2 EXIT
) e 0 is enabled in T
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change pos and movedPoints , we only
show (1) and (7):
posT 0 = posT \ {x 7! hti} by exit
= posS \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ \ {x 7! hti} by (1)
= posS \ {x 7! hti} \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ as x /2 B
= posS 0 \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by exit
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movedPointsT 0 = ; by exit
= movedPointsS 0 by exit
• Case e = exit .x .t and x 2 B , then e 0 = idle.
e 0 is obviously enabled in T .
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change pos and movedPoints , we only
show (1) and (7):
posT 0 = posT by idle
= posS \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by (1)
= posS \ {x 7! hti} \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ as x 2 B
= posS 0 \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK+ by exit
movedPointsT 0 = ; by idle
= movedPointsS 0 by exit
• Case e = idle, then e 0 = idle. The proof is trivial since e and e 0 only
change movedPoint and movedPointsT 0 = movedPointsS 0 = ;.
• Case e = nextSignal .x and x /2 B , then e 0 = nextSignal .x .
e 0 is enabled in T :
e is enabled in S ) first(posS (x )) = ran(homeSignal(s))
) first(posT (x )) = ran(homeSignal(s))
by (1) and x /2 B
) e 0 is enabled in T
T 0  S 0: The proof is trivial since e and e 0 only change movedPoint
and movedPointsT 0 = movedPointsS 0 = ;.
• Case e = nextSignal .x and x 2 B , then e 0 = idle.
e 0 is trivially enabled in T .
T 0 B S 0: The proof is trivial since e and e 0 only change movedPoint
and movedPointsT 0 = movedPointsS 0 = ;.
• Case e = release.r .yes , then e 0 = release.r .yes .
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e 0 is enabled in T :
e is enabled in S ) signalStatusS (signal(r)) = green ^
currentLocksS [{r}] = lockTable[{r}] ^
homeSignal(signal(r)) 2 emptyTracksS
) signalStatusT (signal(r)) = green ^
by (3)
currentLocksT [{r}] = lockTable[{r}] ^
by (8)
homeSignal(signal(r)) 2 emptyTracksT
as (1) implies that emptyTracksS ✓ emptyTracksT
) e 0 is enabled in T
T 0  S 0: Since e and e 0 only change signalStatus(signal(r)), movedPoints ,
and currentLocks(r), we only show (3), (6), (7):
signalStatusT 0(signal(r)) = red by release.r .yes
= signalStatusS 0(signal(r)) by release.r .yes
movedPointsT 0 = ; by release.r .yes
= movedPointsS 0 by release.r .yes
currentLocksT 0 [{r}] = currentLocksT [{r}] \ lockTable[{r}]
by release.r .yes
= ; since r locks at most lockTable[{r}]
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